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1 Since being introduced into China in the late nineteenth century, liberalism has had a
contentious  relationship  with  the  authoritarian  state.  At  best,  it  has  served  as  an
alternative to the ruling ideology (e.g., the Chinese Democratic League in the 1940s); at
worst, it has been a target of political campaigns to crack down on opposition (e.g., the
Anti-Rightist Campaign in the 1950s and the Anti-Bourgeois Liberalism Campaign in the
1980s). In modern Chinese political discourse, liberalism (ziyou zhuyi) is like a ghost that
haunts  China’s  political  leaders  without  having  any  direct  impact  on  policies.  For
students of modern Chinese political thought, it is puzzling that although liberalism is
often used as a yardstick for measuring the progress of Chinese political modernity, it
has failed to take root in China.
2 Max Ko-wu Huang has been a leading expert on Chinese liberalism over the last 15
years. Rather than taking the conventional view that liberalism does not suit Chinese
political culture, he seeks to explain the failure of Chinese liberalism by examining the
process by which liberalism was introduced into the country. In his first book, Yige bei
fangqi de xuanze: Liang Qichao tiaoshi sixiang zhi yanjiu (The Rejected Path: A Study of Liang
Qichao’s Accommodative Thinking, 1994), he argues that since the turn of the twentieth
century, mainstream Chinese intellectuals have rejected the gradual, accommodative,
liberal approach to politics in favour of radical and revolutionary political ideologies
(such as fascism and communism) to drastically overhaul Chinese political institutions.
This sombre view of the fate of Chinese liberalism continues in Huang’s second book,
Ziyou de suoyi ran: Yan Fu dui Yuehan Mier ziyou zhuyi sixiang de renshi yu pipan (The Raison
d’être of Freedom: Yan Fu’s Understanding and Critique of John Stuart Mill’s Liberalism, 1998).
Based on a careful comparison of Yan Fu’s translation with John Stuart Mill’s original
writings, Huang concludes that Yan (the first major Chinese liberal thinker) had a deep
appreciation of Mill’s notions of liberty and individuality, but that his understanding of
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liberalism was coloured by traditional Chinese learning. Missing Mill’s epistemological
pessimism, Yan could not develop an appreciation of Mill’s argument for protecting
individual rights from government intervention. It is this lack of interest in “negative
freedom,” Huang argues, that has led to the demise of liberalism as a viable political
ideology in modern China.
3 In his new book, The Meaning of  Freedom: Yan Fu and the Origins of  Chinese Liberalism,
Huang not only re-states his main argument from Ziyou de suoyi ran for English readers,
but also further explains what he considers to be the causes of the failure of Chinese
liberalism.  Huang  opens  The  Meaning  of  Freedom with  a  detailed  discussion  of  the
historiography of Yan’s life and thought, along with up-to-date information about the
scholarship on Yan.  More important,  as  Thomas Metzger points  out  in his  preface,
Huang’s historiographic discussion is “to identify the significant issues left unresolved
by  this  voluminous,  confusingly  complex  literature,”  thereby  laying  out  the  main
argument in the rest of the book (p. xv). The main argument that Metzger refers to is
Huang’s  finding  that  “not  one  of  Yan  Fu’s  long  line  of Chinese  critics  noticed  the
divergence between Yan Fu’s epistemological perspective and that of the key western
liberal text he translated, J.S. Mill’s On Liberty” (p. xv). 
4 Philosophically speaking, the epistemological divergence lies in Yan’s optimism about
the perfectibility of human beings through education and moral cultivation, and Mill’s
pessimism  about  the  human  propensity  for  taking  selfish  actions  to  protect  one’s
interest.  Politically  speaking,  the  epistemological  divergence  appears  in  Yan’s
preference for promoting “positive freedom” by giving the government the central role
in  moulding  society,  and  Mill’s  predilection  for  protecting  “negative  freedom”  by
stopping  the  government  from  intervening  in  private  life.  This  epistemological
divergence between Yan and Mill becomes the theme that runs through the rest of the
book.  The  divergence  first  appears  in  Chapter  Two,  where  Huang  traces  Yan’s
chequered pursuit of a synthesis of Eastern and Western political philosophies to solve
the domestic and foreign problems of late Qing China. The divergence emerges again in
Chapter Three, where Huang discusses Yan’s creative interpretation of Mill’s On Liberty
as a “realization of a Confucian balance between self and group and the ability of a
nation to succeed in a Darwinist struggle for survival” (p. 151). Finally, in Chapter Four,
the divergence forms the bedrock for Huang’s assessment of Yan as a political thinker
who mixed Mill’s liberalism with Confucian morality. 
5 By highlighting the epistemological divergence between Yan and Mill, Huang casts a
new light on the Chinese translator. In addition to introducing Western liberal thought
to Chinese readers, Huang sees Yan as “a political thinker operating at an intercultural
junction” who both adopted and rejected “beliefs deeply rooted in the two intellectual
traditions making up that junction” (p. 353). This new image of Yan drastically changes
our view of Chinese liberalism. First, the new image of Yan directly challenges
Benjamin Schwartz’s assertion that liberalism was intimately tied to nationalism from
the day it  was introduced to China.  Contrary to Schwartz,  Huang considers Yan an
ardent  supporter  of  liberalism who had no intention of  subjugating the self  to  the
society, the private to the public, and the citizen to the nation. On this score, Yan was
evidently a champion of what Huang calls “Millianism.” In particular, Yan believed in
the  separation  of  individual  freedom,  political  power,  knowledge,  and  morality,  as
opposed  to  the  fusion  of  the  four  realms  in  Rousseauism  (pp.  47-51).  With  Yan’s
Max Ko-wu Huang, The Meaning of Freedom: Yan Fu and the Origins of Chinese Li...
China Perspectives, 2009/3 | 2009
2
“Millianism” as an example, Huang shows that despite failure and setbacks, Chinese
liberals are fervently devoted to building a democratic society in China. 
6 Second,  the  divergence  between Yan and Mill  indicates  a  distinctive  path  that  the
Chinese  liberals  undertook  in  embracing  liberalism.  Instead  of  building  a  political
structure  that  would  protect  individual  rights  based  on  the  notion  of  “negative
freedom,”  Chinese  liberals  focused on creating a  liberal  government  to  change the
behaviour of its citizens. Thus, the goal of Chinese liberals was to create a democratic
society “based on the ‘positive freedom’ of individuals freely pursuing their personal
interests only after an education guided by an enlightened elite has instilled virtue and
wisdom into them, making them altruistic and patriotic” (p. xxiii). As we can imagine,
it is by no means easy to synthesise the “inner” moral values of the Confucian elite with
the “outer” institutions of Western liberalism. Part of the difficulty, as Huang rightly
points out, is that the combination of an enlightened tutelage with the protection of
individual rights has no precedence in either Eastern or Western tradition. To make
matters  worse,  the  elitist  approach  of  Chinese  liberalism  was  deemed  too
“accommodative, gradualist” to solve the pressing problems plaguing China since the
beginning of the twentieth century. For these reasons, Huang writes:
7 All in all, the modern Chinese intellectual mainstream has diverged from Millianism
not only in questioning the extent to which Millianism emphasized the freedom and
rights of the individual but also in failing to grasp the deep connection between this
emphasis and epistemological pessimism. In both these ways, Yan’s thought was typical
of this mainstream. (p.62)
8 Notwithstanding the new perspective he offers on Yan Fu, Huang exaggerates his role
in Chinese liberalism. Taking the classical liberal thoughts of the Victorian Age as the
standard  of  Western  liberalism,  Huang  presents  a  simplistic  picture  of  Chinese
liberalism as a battle between the “accommodative, gradual” approach of Millianism
and the “radical, revolutionary” approach of Rousseauism. In so doing, he reduces the
complex  history  of  Chinese  liberalism  into  a  choice  between  protecting  negative
freedom (as in Mill) and advancing positive freedom (as in Yan). Certainly, this trope of
choosing between two alternative models highlights Yan’s contribution as an original
thinker who creatively combined Mill’s liberalism with Confucian morality based on an
epistemological  optimism.  Yet,  it  also  obscures  the  momentous  changes  in  both
Western liberal thought and Chinese liberalism since World War I. 
9 As Edmund Fung points out, the catastrophe of the war revealed the horrendous social
injustice and brutal exploitations of “organized capitalism.”1 Since the 1920s, Western
liberals (e.g., Harold Laski) had been determined to find a “middle ground” between
democracy  and  socialism.  Post-war  liberals  shifted  their  attention  from  protecting
individual  rights  to  creating  what  is  commonly  known  as  “social  democracy,”  a
benevolent and caring government that would provide protection and services to the
poor and disenfranchised. It was in this context that many Chinese liberals between the
two world wars (e.g., Zhang Junmai, Zhang Dongsun, Luo Longji, Wang Zaoshi, and Chu
Anping)  were  liberals  with  a  socialist  agenda.  Unlike  Yan  Fu,  their  proclivity  for
“positive freedom” was derived from a deep-seated concern with the welfare of the
poor and the exploited, rather than an epistemological optimism from the Confucian
tradition. More important, their attempt at building “social democracy” in China was
based  on  a  critique  of  organised  capitalism  that  was  much  more  monopolistic,
pervasive, and exploitative than the laissez-faire capitalism of Yan Fu’s times. 
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10 In addition to missing the complex history of Chinese liberalism since World War I,
Huang also ignores home-grown liberal thought that is not explicitly tied to Western
liberalism.  If  indeed  part  of  Yan  Fu’s  liberalism  was  “largely  continuous  with  the
Chinese tradition” (p. xxiv), it makes sense that some Chinese liberals should choose to
express  their  liberalism  in  a  language  drawn  from  Chinese  tradition.  One  possible
candidate for home-grown liberal thought is the New Confucianism (xin ru jia) of Xiong
Shili, Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, and Xu Fuguan. Although perceived in certain circles as
complicit  with  the  authoritarian  state,2 the  philosophical  foundation  of  New
Confucianism rests  on the Mencian notion of  a  self-sufficient individual  who is  the
master of his/her actions. More important, the self-sufficient individual has the moral
autonomy to challenge the social and political authorities because he/she is connected
with the universe through practicing what Mou Zongsan calls “moral metaphysics.” Of
course, the self-sufficient moral individual in New Confucianism is not the same as the
self-motivated citizen in Mill’s liberal society. Nevertheless, there is a common thread
centring on the autonomy of the individual vis-à-vis social and political restrictions.
11 Aside  from  overly  investing  in  Yan  Fu’s  typicality,  Huang  succeeds  in  giving  us  a
contemporary  look  at  Yan  Fu  as  we  witness  “a  return  of  liberalism  and  social
democracy” in a  more prosperous and confident China.3 The Yan Fu we see in The
Meaning of Freedom is an original thinker of global vision who draws freely from the
Eastern and Western traditions. Unlike the May Fourth cultural iconoclasts of the 1920s
and 1930s,  and  the  Communist  ideologues  of  the  1950s  and  1960s,  Yan  Fu  did  not
emphasise Western thought at the expense of Confucianism, nor did he blindly accept
state-centred  Confucian  orthodoxy  without  questioning  its  lack  of  interest  in
protecting  individual  rights.  As  Huang  elegantly  puts  it,  we  see  in  Yan  Fu  a
determination “to synthesize two equally irresistible and precious ideals: a picture of
freedom, prosperity, and power offered by the liberal west, and a vision of morality,
altruism, and social  harmony rooted in the Confucian tradition” (p. 259).  Today,  as
China rapidly becomes diverse and complex due to economic growth, we celebrate Yan
Fu’s courage in finding a middle path between individual freedom and social harmony.
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